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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
  ____________ 
 
No. 16-3972 
____________ 
 
BYRON OTTONIEL ARCHILA-LEMUS, 
 
    Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
 
    Respondent 
____________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the  
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A208-537-769) 
Immigration Judge: Honorable Kuyomars Q. Golparvar 
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
May 23, 2017 
 
Before: HARDIMAN, ROTH, and FISHER, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: August 17, 2017             ) 
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
                                                 
 * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
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HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
Byron Archila-Lemus petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration 
Appeals (BIA) denying him withholding of removal and deferral of removal under the 
Convention Against Torture (CAT). We will deny the petition. 
I 
A citizen of Guatemala, Archila-Lemus is a Jehovah’s Witness. While preaching 
from home to home in early 2014, Archila-Lemus began providing religious instruction 
to a young boy named Luis. At that time, Luis lived with his mother and his mother’s 
boyfriend Rafael, who was a member of the Mara-18 gang. Sometime after they met, 
Rafael told Archila-Lemus that he hated Jehovah’s Witnesses, and that he wanted to kill 
all of them. Other Mara-18 members threatened Archila-Lemus’s wife and son.  
On August 8, 2015, after discovering Luis beaten and crying, Archila-Lemus 
asked Luis’s mother if he could take Luis to his home. Rafael objected, warning Archila-
Lemus “not to get involved in their business if [he] didn’t want to [get] killed.” App. 242. 
In spite of that warning, Archila-Lemus talked to Luis about moving in with Archila-
Lemus and his wife.  
Two days later, Archila-Lemus returned to Luis’s home to provide religious 
instruction. During that visit, Luis’s mother asked Archila-Lemus what the Bible taught 
about her sexual relationship with Rafael, who was married to another woman. Archila-
Lemus answered by quoting a verse explaining that adultery is a sin. When Luis’s mother 
told Rafael what Archila-Lemus had said, Rafael became enraged. He assaulted Archila-
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Lemus, pulled a weapon, and threatened: “You get the hell out of here right now. 
Otherwise, I’ll kill you. And make sure you take that other son [of] a bitch you love so 
much,” (referring to Luis). App. 239. Luis’s mother then asked Archila-Lemus to take 
Luis to his grandmother.  
A month later, Rafael appeared in the parking lot of Archila-Lemus’s church. 
After Archila-Lemus sent his family into church, Rafael accosted him, saying “you son of 
a bitch. You ruined my other home.” App. 246. He told Archila-Lemus that he hated him 
and the Jehovah’s Witnesses. Rafael then informed Archila-Lemus that his biological 
son—also a member of Mara-18—would kill Archila-Lemus on his behalf. After this 
incident, Archila-Lemus again went to visit Luis’s mother, who warned him that filing a 
police report would mark his entire family for death.  
About two days after the incident in the church parking lot, Archila-Lemus entered 
the United States without inspection. He was quickly apprehended, however, and 
removed under an expedited order of removal. After he was removed, Archila-Lemus 
moved in with his brother in Guatemala City. Two months later, Archila-Lemus re-
entered the United States and was again arrested and referred to withholding-only 
proceedings. While the Immigration Judge (IJ) found Archila-Lemus credible despite 
“minor inconsistencies,” App. 16, he denied withholding of removal and CAT protection.  
As for the withholding claim, the IJ concluded that although Archila-Lemus’s faith 
as a Jehovah’s Witness “was part of” the reason he was threatened, it was “tangential” 
when compared to Archila-Lemus “continu[ing] to be involved in [Rafael’s] family” 
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under circumstances “more akin to a disagreement.” App. 19. The IJ also dismissed the 
CAT claim because Archila-Lemus: (1) had not claimed to be threatened by “government 
actor[s]” and (2) never gave “the government an opportunity to provide any type of 
protections” by filing a police report. App. 17. The IJ concluded that “if [Archila-Lemus] 
returns and moves to a different city, such as Guatemala City, and has no contact with 
Rafael or his family, the record does not reflect that he would have further persecution.” 
App. 22. The IJ also noted that Archila-Lemus’s wife and youngest son already live in 
Guatemala City.  
A one-member panel of the BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision on both claims in 
reliance on the IJ’s reasoning. This appeal followed.  
II1 
 We review the agency’s factual findings under the “substantial evidence” 
standard, upholding any determination “supported by reasonable, substantial, and 
probative evidence on the record considered as a whole.” Lin-Zheng v. Att’y Gen., 557 
F.3d 147, 155 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992)). 
“[W]hen the BIA defers to an IJ,” as here, “we must review the IJ’s decision as the final 
agency decision.” Xie v. Ashcroft, 359 F.3d 239, 242 (3d Cir. 2004). To reverse the 
                                                 
 1 The BIA had jurisdiction pursuant to 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1(b)(3) and 1240.15. We 
have jurisdiction to review final orders of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a). Though 
Archila-Lemus also challenges the validity of his prior expedited order of removal, we 
have no jurisdiction to hear that claim. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(2).  
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agency’s factual finding, “we must find that the evidence not only supports that 
conclusion, but compels it.” Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 481 n.1.  
III 
A 
 We first consider Archila-Lemus’s withholding claim. Applicants for withholding 
of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) carry the burden to show it is “more likely 
than not” they will face persecution if returned to their home country, “on account of 
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 
Toussaint v. Att’y Gen., 455 F.3d 409, 413 (3d Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). While 
religion need not be the only reason for persecution, it must be “at least one central 
reason for persecuting the applicant.” Gonzalez-Posadas v. Att’y Gen., 781 F.3d 677, 685 
n.6 (3d Cir. 2015) (citation omitted).  
 Archila-Lemus claimed to be persecuted on account of his religion. And while 
there is evidence in the record to support that claim, the record also indicates that 
Archila-Lemus persistently injected himself into Rafael’s home life despite explicit 
instructions to leave them alone. For that reason, the IJ concluded that Rafael’s problem 
with Archila-Lemus was essentially a personal disagreement. The country conditions 
evidence does not otherwise support Archila-Lemus’s claim. On this record, we cannot 
say that Archila-Lemus has met his heavy burden of showing that the record before the 
agency compels reversal of the IJ’s conclusion that Archila-Lemus’s faith was tangential 
to the persecution he experienced. 
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 The IJ also found that “the record does not reflect that [Archila-Lemus] would 
have further persecution” if he relocated from his home to “a different city, such as 
Guatemala City.” App. 22. This conclusion was supported by substantial evidence. The IJ 
cited Archila-Lemus’s testimony that his family has lived in Guatemala City without 
incident, and that his wife’s statement did not corroborate the claim that his family is in 
hiding. While an IJ must determine that relocation is both safe and reasonable, “[i]n any 
given case . . . only one of those questions may be at issue.” Gambashidze v. Ashcroft, 
381 F.3d 187, 192 (3d Cir. 2004). While we agree that “his wife’s severely debilitated 
health” could limit relocation options, Archila-Lemus Br. 50, he testified that she already 
lives in Guatemala City. And the record does not suggest that Archila-Lemus 
meaningfully argued before the IJ that relocation to Guatemala City might be 
unreasonable. For these reasons, we are unpersuaded by the argument that the agency 
erred when it held that Archila-Lemus is not entitled to withholding of removal. 
B 
 Archila-Lemus’s CAT claim also fails. Applicants for CAT protection must show 
that it is “more likely than not” they will face intentional and wrongful “severe physical 
or mental pain or suffering . . . by or at the instigation of or with the consent or 
acquiescence of a public official who has custody or physical control of the victim.” 
Kamara v. Att’y Gen., 420 F.3d 202, 213 (3d Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). 
The IJ must “consider all relevant record evidence,” but “need not discuss every 
piece of evidence mentioned.” Green v. Att’y Gen., 694 F.3d 503, 508–09 (3d Cir. 2012) 
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(alterations and citation omitted). Though Archila-Lemus never sought police assistance, 
he claims the IJ failed to consider his evidence of government “complicity” in Mara-18 
activity, which showed that “fil[ing] futile police reports [would] further endanger” 
Archila-Lemus and his family. Archila-Lemus Br. 53.  
 Archila-Lemus is correct that the IJ did not discuss country condition reports in 
the context of the CAT claim. But the IJ admitted the documents into evidence “in their 
entirety,” App. 221, and noted elsewhere in his decision that he had reviewed “the 
country reports and the country conditions,” App. 18. The IJ also recited testimony by 
Archila-Lemus and his brother that the police would not protect Archila-Lemus, 
suggesting he understood the concern.  
 Furthermore, the reports offered by Archila-Lemus attest to active, albeit 
ineffective, efforts by the Guatemalan government to combat gang violence. See, e.g., 
App. 132–34 (2013 Report for the Department of Justice) (discussing government 
emphasis on “short-term law enforcement” to combat gangs and dismissals of police 
following “investigation [of the] infiltration of organized crime in state institutions”). 
Such efforts suggest the government is neither complicit in, nor willfully blind to, such 
violence as a general matter. Accordingly, the agency’s denial of Archila-Lemus’s CAT 
claim was not erroneous. 
* * * 
For the reasons stated, we will deny Archila-Lemus’s petition for review. 
